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ABSTRACT 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), in its initiative to 
incentivize demand response resources (DRRs) to participate in the day-ahead 
markets (DAMs), enacted Order No. 745. The Order mandated each ISO/RTO 
to perform a monthly cost-effectiveness test, the so-called net benefits test 
(NBT), that determines the monthly threshold price that serves as the 
economic signal for the dispatch of DRRs. The determination of the threshold 
price without explicit consideration of the grid and its associated constraints 
prompted the motivation for our investigation. Analytical considerations of 
the issues were accompanied by extensive numerical studies based on 
simulation. In our studies, we identify the two key unintended consequences 
emanating from the DRR participation in the DAMs. One is  the existence of 
instances where the dispatch of DRRs increases the purchase payments of 
loads not participating in curtailment provision so that those buyers are worse 
off due to the DRR demand curtailments presence in the DAMs. The second 
set of unintended consequences consists of the cases where the participation 
of DRRs results in higher prices to their remaining loads under the FERC 
compensation rules. The NBT fails to test for these unintended consequences 
and based on our simulations studies, such events may occur frequently.  
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In light of the results of these investigations, we propose specific 
modifications to the NBT. The modifications are in three principal areas – data 
usage, explicit consideration of transmission system in the determination of 
the threshold price and an additional test to guarantee that no buyer is worse 
off in the post-curtailment state than in the pre-curtailment state. We propose 
to limit the data to on-peak LMPs instead of the representative offer curve 
data based on data from all the hours of the month. We propose the 
replacement of the system-wide threshold price by node-specific threshold 
prices at each node to explicitly account for transmission considerations. To 
ensure that no post-curtailment load is worse off than in the pre-curtailment 
conditions, we propose the introduction of a simple test to verify that this 
criterion is met. The proposed modifications result in nodal threshold prices 
and this explicit transmission consideration is effective in avoiding the issues 
we identified with the FERC NBT. We illustrate the ability of the proposed 
modifications to address these issues by presenting a representative sample of 
simulation studies from the testing we performed. The results of the testing 
we performed indicate that the instances of higher post-curtailment purchase 
payment are reduced by at least an order of magnitude and in each case every 
node in the system is assured that it is not worse off due to demand 
curtailments. The proposed modifications result in an important reduction in 
the unintended consequences due to demand response participation.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we lay out the contents of this thesis. Or focus is the study of 
the impacts of demand curtailments in the electricity markets under current 
regulatory initiatives. We start by discussing the motivation and background 
of our research to set the stage of the work presented in the thesis. We provide 
a brief summary of the key regulatory initiatives that have led to the current 
rules and we also review the state-of-the-art in the current demand response 
compensation schemes.  
1.1 Motivation and Background 
Growing environmental concerns, the need of energy independence and the 
push for sustainability are the key drivers of electricity-market policies. 
Renewable energy (RE), large-scale storage (LSE) and demand response (DR) 
are technologies the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is keen 
on implementing. The FERC, as the governmental agency in charge of 
regulating the wholesale sales of electricity, oversees the energy markets run 
by the Independent System Operators (ISO) and the Regional Transmission 
Organization (RTO). The ISOs and RTOs are non-profit organizations 
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responsible for administering the electricity markets within one or multiple 
regions. We group all the ISOs and RTOs in the term independent grid 
operator (IGO) to facilitate the discussion. As a result of the intermittency 
effects associated with RE generation and the slow penetration of LSE 
technologies, investors, regulators and system operators are pushing towards 
the demand-side to maintain the reliable operation of the power systems. The 
demand-side can participate in the electricity markets in the form of the so-
called demand response of the consumers. Demand response consists in a 
reduction in electricity usage by the consumer in response to a price, 
emergency or reliability signal. The responsive consumers get compensated 
every time they curtail their electricity usage. We refer to the loads that have 
the capability of providing load reductions as demand response resources 
(DRRs).  
Before the restructuring of the electricity industry, demand response activities 
were grouped into the term demand-side management (DSM). DSM activities 
were tools the integrated utilities used to attain a desired load shape and were 
traditionally divided into six objectives: peak clipping, valley filling, load 
shifting, flexible load shape, strategic conservation and strategic load growth. 
The first four represent objectives to alter the electricity usage at targeted 
times and are nowadays all incorporated into the term demand response. The 
integrated utilities managed all the DSM activities until the advent of the 
restructuring of the electricity industry.  
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Demand response increased its prominence when in 2005, the United States 
Senate passed Energy Policy Act of 2005 (Epact 2005), a bill with several 
provisions for electricity markets [1]. The Epact 2005 mandated the FERC to 
produce a comprehensive study of demand response in the United States. As a 
result of this study the Assessment on Demand Response and Advanced 
Metering (DR&AM) was published in 2006 [2]. The DR&AM recognized the 
benefits of demand response in the electricity markets and made some 
recommendations. The FERC recommended to:  
(i) explore how to better accommodate demand response in wholesale 
markets;  
(ii) explore how to coordinate with utilities, state commissions and 
other interested parties on demand response in wholesale and retail 
markets; and  
(iii) consider specific proposals for compatible regulatory approaches, 
including how to eliminate regulatory barriers to improved 
participation in demand response, peak reduction and critical peak 
pricing programs.  
By implementing these recommendations, demand response became part of 
FERC’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Energy Independence and Security Act 
of 2007 (EIAct 2007) mandated the FERC to conduct a national assessment 
on demand response. This resulted in the publication of A National 
Assessment of Demand Response Potential (NADRP). NADRP identified the 
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barriers to demand response in the electricity market: lack of a direct 
connection between wholesale electricity prices, ineffective demand response 
program design, lack of customer awareness and education, and concern over 
environmental impacts. The NADRP also estimated the nationwide demand 
response potential in 5 and 10 year horizons on a state-by-state basis, and how 
much of the potential can be achieved within those time horizons; and the 
report includes specific policy recommendations for developing incentives 
and for overcoming the above-mentioned barriers. According to the NADRP, 
the 2019 peak load in the United States can be reduced by as much as 150 
GW, compared to the business-as-usual scenario.  
In order to overcome these barriers, the FERC created a new type of market 
player. In Order No. 719, the FERC defined curtailment service providers 
(CSPs) as demand response aggregators [3]. These CSPs are entities that 
enroll customers that are willing to reduce load, into large load aggregations. 
Order No. 719 also amended previous FERC regulations to treat demand 
response comparably to other resources. To accomplish this, the FERC 
mandated the IGOs to:  
(i) accept demand offers from demand response resources,  
(ii) eliminate, during emergencies, certain charges to buyers in the 
energy market for voluntarily reducing demand,  
(iii) permit CSPs to offer demand response on behalf of retail 
customers directly in to the markets. 
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Although the changes introduced by Order No. 719 were significant, in 2011 
the FERC believed that these demand reductions still encountered barriers in 
the electricity markets. This is why in 2011 the FERC enacted Order No. 745. 
In Order No. 745 the FERC mandated all of the IGOs to compensate all of the 
demand response resources that clear in the energy market at the locational 
marginal price (LMP) when used to balance supply and demand. The FERC 
also mandated all IGOs to conduct a monthly cost-effectiveness test that will 
be used as a metric to judge when demand curtailments are allowed in the 
energy markets. This cost-effectiveness metric is a system-wide threshold 
price that is calculated using the so-called net benefits test (NBT). The NBT is 
a monthly procedure that uses historical offer data to determine the price at 
which a demand curtailment results in benefits to the system. Each IGO must 
follow FERC’s guidelines to run the NBT on a monthly basis.  
 
1.2 Review of the State of the Art on the Impacts of FERC Order No. 745 
The question of how much a retail customer should be paid for curtailing its 
demand has been the subject of considerable debate. The nearly 3800 pages of 
comments the FERC received after the publication of the notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NOPR) that eventually resulted in Order No. 745, document the 
various opinions on the issue [4],[5],[6]. Also, the dissenting opinion of FERC 
Commissioner Moeller in Order No. 745, in which, he detailed the rationale 
for his opposition to the rule, provides a summary of some of the key issues of 
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those who do not support the thrust of the ruling [7, pp. 102]. In this section, 
we provide a brief summary of the literature and the comments regarding 
demand response compensation under Order No. 745. 
It is widely accepted that the implementation of demand response in the 
electricity markets can provide substantial benefits including improvement in 
the elasticity of the demand curve, reduction in the price paid by the loads, 
reductions of environmental emissions, betterment of the grid’s reliability, 
and reduction in the costs of developing addition peaking generation. 
Although, all agree that these benefits are attainable, there exists a difference 
in opinion on the way DRRs should be compensated for the curtailment 
services provided.  
The standardization of a demand response compensation scheme was the issue 
the FERC faced when developing Order No. 745. During the process that led 
to the decision that DRRs are paid at the LMP, various opinions had to be 
taken into account. FERC’s decision that demand and supply-side resources 
can substitute each other was based on the premise that “in balancing supply 
and demand, a one megawatt reduction in demand is equivalent to a one 
megawatt increase in energy for purposes of meeting load requirements and 
maintaining a reliable electric system” [4, pp. 15]. Furthermore, under Order 
No. 745 DRRs are only to be dispatched when the cost-effectiveness 
conditions of the NBT are met. The FERC sought and received a large volume 
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of comments on the comparability of demand response and generation 
resources, the compensation proposal, and the implementation of the NBT. 
When asked to submit comments on FERC Order No. 745, one view adopted 
by some is that “demand response (DR) is in all essential respects 
economically equivalent to supply response; and that economic efficiency 
requires, as the NOPR recognizes, that is should be rewarded the same LMP 
that clears the market” [6, pp. 24]. On the other hand, other comments assert 
that DRRs are not equivalent to generation resources and that paying the LMP, 
without some offset for some portion of the retail rate, for demand 
curtailments will discriminate against generation resources in the short run 
and will overcompensate demand response [7, pp. 21].  
In support of their thesis, those who hold the view of the equivalency between 
DRRs and generation resources posit that DRRs provide a superior service to 
generation because they could provide a quicker response than traditional 
generation, reduce environmental emissions and, in addition, mitigate the 
need for the investment in new generation plants [5], [6]. Furthermore, they 
claim that since electricity prices fail to internalize environmental 
externalities, such as toxic air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, and land 
and water use impacts, demand response should be compensated as mandated 
by Order No. 745. They extend their argument by saying that since the 
impacts of these externalities are especially acute at peak hours, demand 
response curtailments at these periods of time avoids the use of peaking plants 
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such as gas turbines. Although there is much truth to this claim, it is no longer 
valid once the DRRs resort to behind-the-meter generation. We refer to 
behind-the-meter generation (BMG) as a generation unit that serves a load and 
is not interconnected with the electricity grid. If a large percentage of demand 
resources use BMG to offer load curtailments to the IGO, then this type of 
demand response does not contribute to the reduction of environmental 
emissions. Also, air pollution in cities and noise levels are a main problem 
with BMG since more commercial buildings are participating in demand 
response. 
Those who oppose the equivalency of DRRs with generation resources hold 
that DRRs should be compensated at the LMP minus the retail rate (RR) [8], 
[9], [10]. The rationale behind this notion is that paying the full LMP fails to 
take into account the savings associated with demand response and results in 
overcompensation for the DRR. Indeed, some argue that paying demand 
response at the LMP represents a double payment and that it may lead to 
inefficient demand response [11]. Ultimately, the FERC adopted the view that 
demand response is equivalent to generation when used to balance supply and 
demand. 
In addition to the equivalence of demand response and generation resources 
and the appropriate compensation level for demand response resources, the 
utilization of the NBT created many comments after the publication of the 
NOPR related to Order No. 745. According to the FERC, the NBT prevents 
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the dispatch of demand response resources when it results in an increased cost 
per unit to the load and that ensures that the benefits of dispatching DRRs 
exceed the costs. One of the main issues raised by the NBT is that it focuses 
solely on the benefits to consumers. The NBT judges cost-effectiveness from 
the point of view of the benefits to one group of market participants and does 
not consider the societal cost of meeting demand. The Market Surveillance 
Committee of the CAISO (MSCCA), in its comments on the NBT, stated that 
“this is a large departure from the FERC market design principle, which is 
nondiscriminatory market access to promote maximum market efficiency, as 
measured by the usual market efficiency metric of producer plus consumer 
surplus.” Furthermore, the MSCCA and NYISO stated that paying DRRs at the 
LMP mines the RR avoids the need of a net benefits test [12].  
One issue not widely discussed in the literature is the non-regional nature of 
the NBT. Since the NBT is based purely on offer-curve analysis and does not 
take into consideration the power system network, it ignores one of the key 
components of the price of electricity: congestion. By ignoring the power 
system constraints, the NBT assumes that the network runs ideally. The NBT 
also assumes that when a demand curtailment is made, all the consumers in 
the system benefit. These assumptions may be too much of a leap of faith and 
need to be investigated further. The reports discussed in this literature review 
use economic methodologies to analyze the possible impacts of Order No. 
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745. Although very relevant and insightful, these reports ignore the 
operational aspects of the power system.  
1.3 Scope and Nature of the Contributions of the Thesis 
In this report, we focus on the study of the impacts of demand curtailments in 
the ISO-run DAMs. We explicitly take into account the requirements of the 
FERC Order No. 745 in the transmission constrained electricity market 
model. Using representative simulation studies we analyze the impacts of 
demand curtailments in the DAMs. We identify they key unintended 
consequences that result from demand response: the existence of instances 
where the dispatch of DRRs increases the purchase payments and the fact that 
some market participants are worse off due to the demand curtailments. We 
also investigate and determine the causal factors of these issues.  
In light of the identified unintended consequences and the identification of the 
causal factors, we propose modifications to the NBT that keep its spirit intact 
and do not change the nature of the procedure.  We propose to use LMP data 
instead of offer data to determine the monthly threshold price. Our proposed 
modifications result in nodal thresholds. To ensure that no buyer is worse off 
due to demand curtailments, we propose to guarantee that this condition is 
met.  
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1.4 Thesis Outline 
The remainder of the thesis is organized in the following manner. In Chapter 
2, we provide a detailed description of NBT and its applications in the clearing 
of the day-ahead markets. We start by describing the requirements mandated 
by the FERC and then proceed to explain the NBT in economic terms. In this 
chapter, we also provide the entire procedure FERC mandates the IGOs to use 
in order to calculate the monthly threshold price. In Chapter 3, we discuss the 
unintended consequences associated with the dispatch of DRRs under the 
current rules. In Chapter 4, we provide the modifications to the NBT that we 
developed. In Chapter 5, we provide the results and our analyses of the 
simulation studies. We provide our concluding remarks and suggestions for 
future research in Chapter 6. In Appendix A, we describe the test system used 
to run all of the simulation studies presented in the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE NET BENEFITS TEST PROCEDURE 
Under FERC Order No. 745, the clearing of a DRR in the DAMs depends on 
the monthly threshold price, as determined by the implementation of the net 
benefits test (NBT). The NBT’s goal is to determine a cost-effectiveness 
condition that restricts participation of DRRs to only those hours in which the 
benefits of the buyers due to the lower electricity prices outweigh the 
payments to the DRRs. Whenever the NBT conditions are met, the DRRs are 
compensated at the LMP at the node at which the curtailment is provided. In 
this chapter we provide the description of the NBT and we formulate the 
modified DAM clearing optimal power flow (OPF) problem with the NBT 
included. In Section 2.1, we provide a discussion of the FERC requirements 
for the NBT. In Section 2.2, we describe all the steps needed to determine the 
monthly threshold price. We devote Section 2.3 to formulate the inclusion of 
the NBT determination in the clearing of the DAMs with DRR load 
curtailment. 
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2.1 FERC NBT Assessment 
In order to determine the hours during which demand-curtailment offers are 
considered in the clearing of the DAMs, each IGO is mandated under Order 
No. 745 to routinely conduct the NBT each month so as to determine the 
monthly threshold to ensure the cost-effectiveness of such curtailment offers. 
We start with a review of the NBT requirements, continue with a discussion of 
the degrees of freedom available to the IGOs and provide an economic 
interpretation of the NBT. 
According to FERC Order No. 745, each DRR is compensated at the LMP at 
the node at which its load curtailment is provided whenever the DRR offer is 
used by the IGO to balance supply and demand and the specified FERC 
conditions are met [7]. The NBT mechanism is the FERC’s procedure to 
ensure that the IGO uses cost-effective dispatch of the DRRs. The NBT, in 
essence, compares the total benefits of dispatching DRRs to the total payments 
of the buyers in compensation for the demand curtailment provision. The total 
benefits are the net savings of the post-DRR curtailment loads brought about 
by the reduced hourly electricity prices due to the curtailments.  
Each IGO calculates using a representative offer curve based on data from the 
same month of the preceding year, the price at which the dispatch of DRRs 
becomes cost-effective. Moreover, Order No. 745 mandates the IGOs to 
comply with the following requirements: 
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 The IGO must publish the monthly threshold price on the 15th day of 
the preceding month.  
 The determination of the monthly threshold price requires the use of a 
representative offer curve for the entire month constructed from the 
offer data submitted for that month in the previous year; the 
determination may incorporate any changes in fuel prices and resource 
availability and may use numerical smoothing of the representative 
offer curve.  
Order No. 745 also provides certain degrees of freedom in the implementation 
of the NBT by each IGO in terms of the construction of the adjusted 
representative curve due to  
 the ability to adjust for changes in fuel prices and resource availability, 
and 
 the ability to use a smoothing technique to construct a continuous 
curve. 
Such degrees of freedom allow the IGO to construct the adjusted 
representative curve in non-unique ways due to the multiple curves that may 
result. There exist no clear metrics to assess whether a particular curve is 
better than another possible curve. As such, the selection of the adjusted 
representative offer curve is arbitrary since the adjusted curve is a function of 
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the resolution used in the offer data, the fuel price indices adopted for 
measuring the changes and the smoothing technique deployed [13]-[17].  
We provide an economic interpretation of the effects of the NBT 
determination by considering a single hourly DAM. The analysis of the NBT 
in this section is based on the assumption used by FERC Order No. 745 that 
there are no transmission constraints in the grid and considers the 
transmission unconstrained market clearing problem (TUMCP). We represent 
the market corresponding to the snapshot of the system for that hour.  
In the TUMCP, the IGO uses the submitted generation offers by the sellers to 
construct the supply curve by sorting them in order of increasing prices. 
Similarly, the IGO constructs the demand curve by sorting the buyers’ 
demand bids in order of decreasing prices. In Fig. 2.1, we illustrate 
graphically the clearing of a DAM using supply-side offers and the demand-
side bids. The intersection of the supply and demand curves     * *,  
determines the market equilibrium with  * as the total cleared demand and 
 *  as the system marginal price (SMP). Each seller (buyer) receives (pays) 
the SMP for each MWh sold (bought). We next include the effects of demand 
curtailments in the market equilibrium in the DAM. 
16 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Equilibrium of an hourly DAM 
We consider the dispatch of a DRR curtailment that reduces the system load 
demand by . Such a change essentially produces a shift in the demand curve 
to the left. This shift results in a modified market equilibrium     * *,  , 
where  * is the modified cleared demand and  * is the post-curtailment 
SMP as shown in Fig. 2.2. Since the modified cleared demand  * (where 
   * *      ) is necessarily lower than the demand without DRRs, the 
monotonic non-decreasing nature of the supply curve implies that    * *   .  
With the participation of the DRRs in the DAM, the post-curtailment SMP,
 * , is used to pay/buy each MWh including the curtailment provided by the 
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DRR. As such, the social, consumer and producer surpluses may change with 
respect to the case with no DRR participation. 
 
Figure 2.2: Modified market equilibrium with demand curtailments 
 
Next, we examine the repercussions of the post-curtailment supply-demand 
curve equilibrium. Consider Fig 2.3 areas A and A . For    
* *
   , A
represents part of the reduction in the producer surplus with respect to the pre-
curtailment equilibrium. This reduction results in potential savings for the 
post-curtailment loads. As a result, these loads may obtain additional benefits 
of using electricity at the lower price and so their consumer surplus may 
increase relative to the pre-DRR curtailment situation. The producers whose 
post-curtailment energy is sold in the DAM are compensated at the post-
curtailment SMP  * and so their producer surplus is reduced. Also, some 
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sellers may not be able to sell at the post-curtailment equilibrium. The area 
A  is       * * *      represents the total reduction in the payments to the 
supply side by the post-curtailment load in the post-curtailment market. This 
is simply a transfer of some of the producer surplus to those consumers whose 
loads are not curtailed. However, we have so far not considered any payment 
to incentivize the DRR to provide curtailment. 
Next, we consider the area A . We view A  to represent the total value of 
dispatching the DRRs since under the FERC Order No. 745 all the DRRs 
whose offers clear in the DAM are compensated at the post-curtailment SMP. 
Thus, the area A ,       * * *     constitutes the total payments to the DRR 
for the load curtailment. Since this payment must be made by the consumers 
that have post-curtailment loads, in effect, this represents a reduction in the 
benefits [18]-[20]. The NBT determines the point in the representative offer 
curve where the benefits of dispatching demand curtailments are exactly equal 
to the payments to the providers of these curtailments. In other words, the 
threshold value in our discussion corresponds to the value
*
ˆ   , where
 A A .  
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Figure 2.3: Demand curtailments benefits and payments to DRRs 
2.2 The Threshold Price Determination 
We devote this section to describe the procedure an IGO is mandated to 
implement in order to calculate the threshold price for each month of the year. 
This monthly threshold price establishes when demand curtailments are 
deemed to be beneficial to the IGO’s system for each day of that month. The 
determination of the monthly threshold price consists in three steps: 
(i) determination of a representative offer curve for the month, 
(ii) smoothing of the representative offer curve, and 
(iii) determination of the point where the smoothed representative offer 
curve becomes inelastic. 
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The construction of the representative offer curve for month m of year y
requires the use of the offer data for the same month m in the year 1y  . The 
IGO collects the offer data from each hour of that month. The hours 
pertaining to the month m  form the set 
 : 1, 2, , , 1, 2, ,12 , 1.m mh h H m for year y   H    
For each hour mhH , the offers made by each of the ,m hS sellers who 
participated in the hourly DAM are used to construct the sets 
  , , ,, , , ,, , 1,2, , , 1, 2, , ; 1, 2, , ;
1, 2, ,12.
s s s s
m h mm h m h m h m h
p E s S h H
m
     

E    

 
The offer is the order pair  , ,, ,,s sm h m hp   with , ,s m hp  representing the 
capacity offered by seller s at price ,
,
s
m h
 .  Since at each hour a seller may 
offer power at various prices, we use the superscript  to denote each of the 
segments of the seller’s s offer for hour h. We depict in Fig. 2.4 the 
aggregated offer supply curve of seller s at hour h .
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Figure 2.4: Seller s’s offer supply curve for hour h in month m 
 
The construction of a representative offer curve entails the collection of all the 
sellers’ offers for each hour h  of month m  of year 1y   and their sorting 
them into 1mK   “buckets”. The “bucket” 
( )
,
k
m h
G  is the sub-set that contains 
the indices ( , )s  of the sellers whose prices fall in the interval  
( 1) ( ),k k
m m
    , 1,2, , 1.mk K  These price levels may be set arbitrarily 
by the IGO and depend on the minimum and maximum offers permitted in the 
IGO’s market. The price levels satisfy 
( ) ( 1) , 1,2, , ; 1,2, ,12.k k m mm m k K m  
                  (2.1) 
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m
  is the step size between the price levels and is selected by the IGO 
based on the resolution desired for the offer curve construction. We denote by 
( )mK
m
  the monthly ceiling offer price and by (0)
m
 the monthly floor price. 
The bucket ( )
,
k
m h
G  is defined formally by  
 ( ) ( 1) , ( ) ,, , ,( , ) : , 1 ; 1 ;
1, 2, , ; 1, 2, , ;
1, 2, ,12.
k k s k s
m hm h m m h m m h
m m
s s S E
k K h H
m
          
 

G
 
  
For 0,k  we define a separate floor-price bucket (0)
,m h
G as 
 (0) ,1 (0) ,, ,( ,1) : , 1 ; 1,2, , ; 1,2, ,12,s m h mm h m h ms s S h H m      G    
where 1  because only the lowest-priced offer of each seller s may be set to 
the floor price.  
In order to provide a representative value of how much power was offered in 
the month m within the interval delimited by two adjacent price levels, 
( 1) ( )and , 1,2, , ,k k mm m k K 
   we use all the indices ( , )s  collected in the 
bucket ( )
,
, 0,1, 2, ,k
mm h
k KG  , to evaluate ( )k
m
g , the average capacity 
offered:  
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( )
,
,
,
( , )( )
( )
,
, 0,1, 2, , ; 1,2, ,12.
k
m m h
m
s
m h
h sk
mm k
m h
h
p
g k K m

 

  
 

H G
H
G

    (2.2) 
Each ( )k
m
g  is paired with its corresponding price level
( ) , for 0,1,2, ,k mm k K   . In Fig. 2.5 we plot as a step function all the price 
levels ( ) , for 0,1,2, ,k mm k K   with respect with the cumulative sum of all 
the ( ) , for 0,1,2, ,k mmg k K  . The curve constructed with the segments of 
length ( )k
m
g at the corresponding price levels ( )k
m
 is called the 
representative offer curve (ROC).  
 
Figure 2.5: The representative offer curve for month m 
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The ROC is the vehicle used to determine the NBT threshold value. FERC 
mandated each IGO to use numerical methods to determine a smoothed and 
differentiable version of the ROC [7, pp. 63]. The IGO’s may use any 
numerical criterion to determine the expression for the continuous function 
( ) m  that “best” fits the data of each monthly ROC. We refer to 
( ) , 1,2, ,12
m
m     as the adjusted representative offer curve (AROC) for 
the month m (see Fig. 2.6). Typical expressions for ( ) m  include polynomial, 
exponential and logarithmic functions. Each IGO has the freedom to choose 
which function they consider fits best the ROC.  
 
Figure 2.6: Adjusted representative offer curve for month m 
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The FERC mandated threshold price is determined using the AROC for each 
month. This threshold determines the price beyond which the benefit to the 
load from the reduced LMP resulting from the demand curtailments exceeds 
the total payments to the DRRs. Based on FERC’s analysis, the threshold 
point along the AROC is located where the AROC becomes inelastic. In other 
words, demand curtailments are cost-effective when the nature of the AROC is 
such that small decreases in generation being called to serve load will result in 
LMP decreases that are sufficient to offset the payments to the DRRs [7, pp. 
63]. The NBT condition is giving using the AROC as:   
 
( ) ( )
, 1, 2, ,12.m m
d
m
d
 
 
 

                                 
(2.3) 
Let 
m
 denote the solution of (2.3) and set m  the monthly threshold price 
with 
   , 1, 2, ,12.m m m m
                                      (2.4) 
Each IGO must use these monthly threshold prices to determine the dispatch 
of the demand curtailments into the DAMs. Whenever the LMP at a node is 
greater or equal to m  for each month, the IGO dispatches all the DRRs that 
offered demand curtailment at this node. Each such DRR is paid at the post-
curtailment LMP outcome of the DAM for each MW curtailed in hour h.  
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2.3 Application of the NBT in the DAMs 
In this section, we analyze the repercussions of the FERC NBT using the 
extended transmission constrained market model with the explicit 
representation of the DRRs. We use typical market performance metrics 
needed to assess the outcomes of the DAMs. We focus on the DAM operated 
by the IGO for the MWh commodity in the hour h and represent the system 
by a snapshot that is assumed to hold for the entire hour. To determine the 
offers and bids that are accepted and the associated amounts and prices for 
each seller and buyer, the IGO uses the solution of the market clearing OPF. 
We review briefly the formulation of this problem and state its extension with 
the explicit representation of the DRRs.  
We consider a DAM that consists of a set of ,m hS  sellers, denoted by ,m hS , 
and a set of ,m hB  buyers, denoted by ,m hB . For , 1,2, ,12mh m H  , let 
us denote the integral of the seller s’s marginal offer price by  
,
s s
m h
p  as a 
function of the real power supply sp and the integral of the buyer b’s marginal 
bid price by 
,
( )b b
m h
p  as a function of the real power demanded bp . 
The objective of the IGO is to maximize the societal net benefits given by the 
difference between the benefits ,
1 ,
( )m h b b
b m h
p

B
of the buyers and the costs
 ,1 ,
m h s s
s m h
p

S to purchase from the sellers. We next provide a statement of 
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the constraints that are considered in the formulation: the power flow relations 
at each node and the real power flow capacity in the transmission lines.  We 
consider a transmission network with the (N+1) buses in the set N , with 
 : 0,1, , ,n n N N   
and the L lines in the set 
 : 1,2, , .j j J=J   
We assume that the DC power flow conditions hold. We denote the diagonal 
branch susceptance matrix by dB and the reduced branch-to-node incidence 
matrix by A . We denote the slack bus nodal susceptance vector by 0b
[22],[27].  
We define 
,
g
n m h
p   ,dn m hp as the total power generated (demanded) at node n. 
The expressions for these variables are 
 
,
, 0,1,2, ,g sn
s is
at node n
m h
p p n N

  
S

                     
(2.5) 
and  
 
,
, 0,1,2, , .d bn
b is
at node n
m h
p p n N

  
B
                     (2.6) 
We construct the injection power vector 
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1 2, , ,,
, , ,
T
g Ng g g
Nm h m h m hm h
p p p      p   
and in the withdrawal vector  
1 2, , ,,
, , , ,
T
d Nd d d
Nm h m h m hm h
p p p      p   
respectively. 
 
We write the power flow equations as  
, , ,
,g d
m h m h m h
  p p B                               (2.7) 
and the power flow equation for the slack node as 
 00 0, , ,
,Tg d
m h m h m h
p p    b 
                             
(2.8) 
where ,m h is the vector containing the nodal voltage phase of all nodes. The 
real power
 
flows at each line are calculated as  
 
,,
.d m hm h f B A                                          (2.9) 
We model the constraints on the real power flows of the lines of the system 
using the inequality  
 
,
,max
m h
 f f                                             (2.10) 
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where maxf is the vector containing all the real power flow limits at each line 
and we denote it as 1 2, , ,
Tmax max max max
Jf f f   f . 
We can now state the formulation of the transmission constrained DAM 
problem (TCDAMP) as 
 
0
, ,
,, , ,
0 0 0 ,, , ,
,,
, ,
1 1
max ( ) ( )
T
max
d
m h m h
g d
m hm h m h m h
g d
m hm h m h m h
m hm h
b b s s
m h m h
b s
subject to
p p
p p

 
 

  
  
 
  
  
 






 







 
B S
p p B
b
B A f
 

 
              (2.11) 
We denote (2.11) as  , ,,m h m hM S B and since no DRRs are included as market 
participants we call it the pre-curtailment DAM [21]. The solution of 
 , ,,m h m hM S B determines the optimum values of the dual variables 
associated with the power balance constraints and the line flow constraints. 
We call 
,
*
n m h
   the pre-curtailment LMP at node nN ,and ,
*
g
n m h
p 
 
and 
,
*
d
n m h
p 
 
are the cleared generation and demand, respectively, at that node .  
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The pre-curtailment purchase payments at node n are given by 
 
,, ,
**
,dn n nm hm h m hw p
        
B                             (2.12) 
and their sum constitutes the system pre-curtailment purchase payments  
 ,, ,
0
**
.dn nm hm h m h
n
w p

        
N
B                              (2.13) 
Similarly, the pre-curtailment total producer revenues are 
 ,, ,
0
**
.gn nm hm h m h
n
w p

        
N
S                            (2.14) 
In addition, we evaluate the pre-curtailment congestion rents ,m h   
 , , ,, ,
0 0
* ** *
.d gn n n nm h m h m hm h m h
n n
p p  
 
                    
N N
        (2.15) 
The IGO uses the outcomes of  , ,,m h m hM S B  to assess the participation of 
the DRRs in the DAM of hour h in line with FERC NBT cost-effectiveness 
criterion. The IGO collects the set of nodes whose pre-curtailment LMPs are 
at or above the threshold price m  to construct 
 ,, *ˆ : .n m h mm h n     N  
Each DRR at a node 
,
ˆ
m h
nN is dispatched by the IGO. We denote the set of 
buyers with demand-response capability by 
,
ˆ
m h
B . We denote ,m hB as the set 
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that contains all the pure buyers in the electricity market. The total demand-
curtailment at each node nN is 
 
,
,
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ 1
ˆ
,
,
ˆ
,
0 ,
ˆ
.
ˆ
ˆ
d
n
m h
m h
b
b
b at n
m h
m h
p
n
n
p











B
N
N
                                  (2.16) 
We impose the condition that a DRR player cannot offer a demand curtailment 
that exceeds his demand. We construct the nodal demand curtailment vector
 
 
1 2, , ,,
ˆ , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ .d N
T
d d d
Nm h m h m hm h
p p p    p   
In order to take into account the DRRs that cleared the NBT threshold, we 
modify the objective function and the power flow constraints of 
 , ,,m h m hM S B  to include the nodal demand curtailments. We formulate the 
DAM with the demand response participation  , , ,ˆ, ,m h m h m hM S B B  as:  
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 
  0
max
, ,
,
,
, ,, , ,
0 0 0 0, ,, , ,
, ,
ˆ ˆ
, ,
ˆ ˆ
, ,
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
max
ˆ
ˆ
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
T
d
m h m h
m h m h
g d d
m h m hm h m h m h
g d d
m h m hm h m h m h
m h m h
b b b b
m h m h
s s b b
m h m h
b b
s b
subject to
p p p
p p
p p

 
 
 
 


   
   
 
 















 
 
B B
BS
f
p p p B
b
B A
 

    
(2.17) 
Equation (2.17) is referred to as the DAM with DRR participation and its 
solution as the post-curtailment outcomes, which are used to settle the DAM 
[22]-[27]. We call 
,
*
n m h
   the post-curtailment LMP at node nN , and 
,
*
g
n m h
p 
 
 
,
*
d
n m h
p     
the cleared post-curtailment generation (demand). The 
total purchase payments to the DRRs in hour h are 
, , ,
**
ˆ
ˆ .dn nm h m h m h
n
p 

      = N
                                   (2.18) 
The total hourly benefits are 
, ,, , ,
,
* ** *
ˆ ,d dn n n nm h m hm h m h m h
m h
n
u p p 

                         
N
N
    
(2.19) 
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where 
,m h
 N N is the subset of nodes that benefit from the demand 
curtailments defined by 
 , ,, * *: .n nm h m hm h n          N  
The additional hourly per-unit charge, ,m hv , for the buyers due to the payment 
to the DRRs is given by 
, ,
,
, ,
**
ˆ
* *
ˆ
.
ˆ
d
n nm h m h
m h
d d
n nm h m h
n
n
p
v
p p




      

         


N
N
                           (2.20) 
In essence, a buyer at node n N  pays  *, ,n m h m hv    $/MWh for its 
consumption in hour h. The total post-curtailment consumer payments at node 
n, 
,n m h
w B , are 
 *, ,, , ,
* *
ˆ .d dn n n nm h m hm h m h m hw v p p
               
B
           
(2.21) 
The total post-curtailment purchase payments are 
  *, ,, , ,
* *
ˆ .d dn n nm h m hm h m h m h
n
w v p p

               
B
N
        (2.22) 
The post-curtailment producer revenues are  
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,, ,
**
.gn nm hm h m hn
w p

      
S
N                           
(2.23) 
The post-curtailment congestion rents are 
 *, , , , ,
, ,,
* *
**
ˆd dn n nm h m h m h m h m h
g
n nm h m hm h
n
n
v p p
p
 
 


                
       


N
N
 (2.24) 
The pre-curtailment metrics in (2.18) – (2.24) are used to assess the impacts 
of the demand curtailments in the electricity markets. The benefits of demand 
curtailments may be evaluated by a comparative analysis of pre- and post-
curtailment market outcomes. In essence, the IGO runs the DAM without 
considering the demand-curtailment offers, then determines the DRRs that 
satisfy the NBT and then runs the DAM again, this time considering the 
demand-curtailment offers.  
2.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we reviewed the thrust of the FERC Order No. 745 and 
provided an analytic framework for the evaluation of the impacts. We 
discussed the requirements of the NBT as mandated by the FERC and 
provided an economic analysis. We discussed in detail the procedure required 
to determine the monthly threshold price. We also analyzed the repercussions 
of the FERC NBT using the extended transmission constrained market model 
with the explicit representation of the DRRs.  
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CHAPTER 3 
IMPACTS OF THE NBT IN THE DAMs 
 
We devote this chapter to present representative results of extensive 
simulation studies to assess the impacts of demand curtailments in the DAMs 
under Order No. 745 rules. We discuss the system-wide effects of the demand 
curtailments and identify the key unintended consequences associated with 
the dispatch of DRRs. We identify two important ramifications of the FERC 
NBT: the increase in payments incurred by loads due to the dispatch of DRRs 
and the increases in the post-curtailment LMPs at some nodes of the system.  
In Section 3.1, we start by a description of the test system used and discuss 
the nature and scope of the studies. Section 3.2, we analyze the outcomes of 
the DRR dispatch under the NBT requirements. In Section 3.3, we discuss the 
issues associated with the increase in the post-curtailment LMPs at certain 
nodes in the system and discuss their impacts.  
3.1 Scope and Nature of the Simulations 
We use the results of representative simulation studies to identify some 
important impacts of the NBT which were not intended by the FERC Order 
No. 745. In this section we summarize the key characteristics of the 
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representative case studies used to assess the impacts of the NBT in the 
outcomes of the DAMs. For all the studies presented, we use a test system 
based on the modified IEEE 118-bus system [28]. A detailed description of 
the test system can be found in Appendix A.  
We use the load shapes from the year 2010 of ISO New England (ISO-NE) 
and the Midwest ISO (MISO). The system load demand at a given hour is the 
aggregated hourly demand of all the loads in the system. The load at each 
node in the test system is a specified fraction of the system load demand. We 
scale the loads so that the annual peak load equals 9,600 MW. We use the 
monthly ROCs of the two ISOs to construct the test system offer curves. For 
each month, we make the test system offer curve to have the same shape as 
the corresponding monthly ROC. 
Each load node in the system is able to provide demand curtailments. The 
total capacity of demand response at each node in the system is expressed as a 
fraction of the annual peak load demand at the node. In the studies, we 
investigate the impacts of various levels of demand response capacity 
percentages c and evaluate the impacts of demand curtailments on the system. 
In these studies, we limit the DRR dispatch to the afternoon hours from 2 P.M 
to 7 P.M to emulate realistic conditions in the DAMs of the ISOs.  In table 3.1 
we summarize the characteristics of the case studies.  
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Table 3.1: Description of the case studies 
 
case description 
case c  ISO-NE offer and load shapes with 
demand response capacity percentage c 
case c  MISO offer and load shapes with 
demand response capacity percentage c 
 
We refer to 0 and 0  as the base cases for the two sensitivity studies 
without demand response dispatch. We use each base case as reference with 
respect to which we measure the impacts of demand curtailments in the 
sensitivity studies. 
 
3.2 System-Wide Impacts of Demand Curtailments 
 
The system-wide benefits arising from demand curtailments have been 
documented earlier [18], [19], [22]. The principal benefits include a reduction 
in the annual peak load demand, lower purchase payments by the non-
curtailed loads and a drop in the congestion rents collected by the ISO. In this 
section, we describe the system-wide benefits we encountered in our 
simulation studies due to demand curtailments.  We start with the base cases 
0 and 0 with no demand response capacity available. In Table 3.2, we 
show the hourly and annual values of the cleared demand, buyer payments 
and congestion rents for case 0 . Next, we present the results of the 
simulation with 3% demand response capacity in Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.2: Case 0 system-wide metrics 
metric 
hourly values 
annual values 
average max min 
cleared demand (MWh) 5,443 9,600 3,363 47.68 × 106 
buyer payments (million $) 0.378 3.824 0.081 3,316 
congestion rents (million $) 0.033 0.181 0 294.99 
 
Table 3.3: Case 3 system-wide metrics 
metric 
hourly values 
annual values 
average max min 
cleared demand (MWh) 5,401 9,449 3,363 47.31× 106 
buyer payments (million $) 0.369 3.202 0.081 3,237 
congestion rents (million $) 0.024 0.181 0 216.05 
 
 
We can infer from the preceding tables that the 3% demand response 
curtailments result in noticeable system-wide benefits. The total cleared 
demand reduction was 0.37×106 MWh, which represents a 0.77% reduction 
when compared to the case with no demand response participation. The 
reduction in cleared demand resulted in a reduction in the system-wide buyer 
payments of $79 million. An interesting by-product is the 27% reduction in 
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the total congestion rents. We tabulate the system-wide metrics for the cases 
0  and 3 in the Tables 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.  
Table 3.4: Base case 0  system-wide metrics 
metric 
hourly values 
annual values 
average max min 
cleared demand (MWh) 6,056 9,683 3,953 53.05 × 106 
buyer payments (million $) 0.352 1.791 0.144 3,090 
congestion rents (million $) 0.013 0.051 0 115.63 
 
Table 3.5: Case 3  system-wide metrics 
metric 
hourly values 
annual values 
average max min 
cleared demand (MWh) 6,020 9,393 3,953 52.73× 106 
buyer payments (million $) 0.349 0.884 0.144 3,060 
congestion rents (million $) 0.009 0.051 0 85.90 
 
The results from 3 show that the 3% demand response capacity also results 
in system-wide benefits. A reduction of 0.6% in cleared demand results in $30 
million of savings to the consumers. The congestion rents in 3 are 25% 
lower than the congestion rents in case 0 . 
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The results for these two test cases provide a representative illustration of the 
beneficial impacts of demand curtailments in the DAMs. However, there are 
also unintended consequences that may result from the dispatch of DRRs 
under the rules of FERC Order No. 745. We next examine the negative 
impacts that result from demand curtailments. 
Due to the nature of the FERC NBT rules, specifically, the use of a system-
wide threshold price to judge when nodal demand curtailments are beneficial 
to all market participants, there are instances where the societal costs of DRR 
participation are higher than its benefits. We say an instance where the 
societal costs of demand response are higher than the benefits has occurred 
when the payments to the DRRs outweigh the savings resulting from a lower 
post-curtailment LMP. This issue is called the unit billing effect in Order No. 
745 and FERC accepts this result due to the “apparent computational 
difficulty of adopting a dynamic approach that incorporates the billing unit 
effect in the dispatch algorithms at this time” [7, pp. 64]. In this section, we 
show how often these instances occurred in our simulation studies.In Table 
3.6, we show, in a monthly basis, the metrics associated with the inefficient 
demand curtailments in case 3. We present the monthly percentage of 
curtailments that resulted in extra buyer payments.  This is calculated by 
dividing the number of hours that resulted in extra payments due to demand 
response by the total hours during which curtailments were allowed.  
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Table 3.6: Extra payments due to demand response curtailments in case 3  
  extra payments due to demand curtailments ($) 
month of 
2010 
percentage 
 of hours with  
extra payments 
hourly values 
monthly  
values average max min 
Jan 71 4,581 11,463 1,467 293,214 
Feb 62 9,470 18,069 3,795 482,954 
Mar 5 4,401 5,820 923 30,804 
Apr 11 4,033 4,725 4,640 56,457 
May 10 5,017 17,255 2,915 65,218 
Jun 5 6,075 20,289 3,674 42,523 
Jul 10 13,370 23,851 2,274 187,184 
Aug 19 10,076 23,982 665 261,984 
Sep 3 7,292 29,341 116 36,461 
Oct 5 5,897 6,245 5,440 41,280 
Nov 31 5,797 10,518 3,774 237,676 
Dec 18 2,101 4,820 921 54,617 
 
Also shown are the hourly and monthly values of the extra payments due to 
the inefficient dispatch of DRRs. These extra payments are computed by 
calculating the difference between the demand response benefits and the 
payments to the DRRs. We see that during the months of January and 
February, approximately 71 and 62 percent of the hours during which demand 
curtailments were allowed, resulted in an inefficient dispatch of DRRs. This 
means that, for these two months, the NBT incorrectly deemed cost-effective 
several hours that in the end resulted in higher consumer payments. In other 
words, the NBT was wrong for more than half of the curtailment hours. 
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In Table 3.7, we show demand response curtailment metrics for case 3 . For 
the months of October and November, we see that all of the demand 
curtailments that the NBT deemed cost-effective resulted in higher buyer 
payments. Contrary to what is intended from the dispatch of DRRs, they 
resulted in an increase of the total monthly buyer payments due to the demand 
curtailments. Furthermore, only the months of June, July and August have a 
larger number of efficient curtailments.   
 Table 3.7: Extra payments due to demand response curtailments in case 3  
  extra payments due to demand curtailments ($) 
month of 
2010 
percentage 
of hours with  
extra payments 
hourly values 
monthly  
values average max min 
Jan 69 2,750 21,064 6 233,770 
Feb 89 2,679 7,737 521 286,692 
Mar 81 2,668 6,907 8 277,449 
Apr 96 6,453 11,009 440 819,479 
May 75 3,608 14,429 448 238,129 
Jun 40 2,325 8,721 204 125,524 
Jul 10 4,015 11,350 461 56,205 
Aug 21 5,182 10,312 139 145,086 
Sep 50 3,083 7,592 490 107,915 
Oct 100 4,052 7,281 1,182 510,547 
Nov 100 4,907 7,231 38 559,439 
Dec 61 3,602 12,264 128 273,747 
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These extra payments are a result of the very small difference between the 
pre- and post-curtailment LMP at some nodes. A high post-curtailment LMP 
results in payments to the DRR such that they are not compensated by the 
benefits. We see that in some instances the FERC NBT fails to capture this 
situation in most curtailment hours. Also, we see that there exists a situation 
in which some nodes experience higher post-curtailment LMPs. 
3.3 Nodes Negatively Impacted By Demand Curtailments  
When demand curtailments are made, the post-curtailment power demands at 
the DRR nodes are modified with respect to the pre-curtailment state. This 
modification results in different outcomes in the congestion patterns in the 
system. The congestion rents may decrease at the nodes where demand 
curtailments are made, thus reducing the post-curtailment LMPs; however, 
this may not be the case in nodes that have little or no demand response 
participation. 
Due to the system-wide nature of the NBT, the threshold price may not be a 
representative metric to correctly judge the cost-effectiveness of a demand 
curtailment at all nodes. In Fig. 3.1, we show the pre- and post-curtailment 
LMPs at node 8 for the week May 1 – 7, 2010, for the case 3 . Under the 
NBT, a DRR at node 8 is, therefore, deemed to be non-economic and so 
receives no compensation during the entire week. We see that during hours 
with demand curtailments at other nodes, the post-curtailment LMP at node 8 
44 
 
was actually higher than it was before with no demand response participation. 
Thus, the buyers at node 8 do not benefit from demand response and, in fact, 
are caused to incur higher prices by the curtailments made at other nodes. 
Such a situation is an unintended consequence of the DRR dispatch and 
negatively impacts the non-DRR buyers, who buy electricity at nodes that 
experience increases in the post-curtailment LMPs. 
 
Figure 3.1: Pre- and post-curtailment LMPs during the week of May 1-7 at 
node 8 in study case 3  
Another interesting situation arises for the same May week at node 116. In 
Fig. 3.2, we plot the node 116 pre- and post-curtailment LMPs at node 116 for 
the same week as in the preceding figure. This node experiences reductions in 
the post-curtailment LMPs at all hours at which demand curtailments were 
allowed.  Contrary to the situation with node 8, for node 116 the level of the 
monthly threshold price is such that, it permitted the dispatch of DRRs at 
several hours during the first week of May.  
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Figure 3.2: Pre- and post-curtailment LMPs during the week of May 1 -7  at 
node 116 in study case 3  
 
The discussion of the nodes 8 and 116 is indicative of the disparity in the way 
the nodes in the system are impacted by the demand curtailments. Indeed, our 
analysis of the 3 and 3 case studies indicates that there are nodes in the 
system experience higher post-curtailment LMP so often that at the end of the 
year their consumer payments were higher than the case without no-DRR 
participation. Out of the 99 load nodes, 19 experienced an increase in the 
annual consumer payments due to the demand curtailments for case 3 . In 
Table 3.8, we show consumer-payment related metrics for the 10 nodes that 
experienced the greatest percentage increase in load payments at the end of 
the year for case 3 . The node that experienced the highest percentage 
increase in the consumer payments with respect to case 0 , is node 8 at 
1.17%.  
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Table 3.8: Nodes with increase in buyer payments in case study 3  
 
node 
number 
percentage 
of nodal  
reduction of  
energy 
nodal consumer payments 
increase % increase 
1 0.316 190,872 0.76 
2 0.316 70,815 0.71 
3 0.316 149,245 0.78 
4 0.290 169,688 0.90 
6 0.312 202,248 0.79 
8 0.248 153,291 1.17 
11 0.316 249,220 0.72 
12 0.318 160,341 0.69 
13 0.345 81,697 0.47 
16 0.323 75,630 0.60 
 
For contrast, we show in Table 3.9 the nodes that experienced the highest 
decrease in consumer payments for case 3 . These nodes have greater 
demand response participation and also experience a decrease in the annual 
consumer payments of approximately 3% compared to case 0 . We also 
simulated cases with greater demand response penetration to study the impact 
on the negatively affected nodes. In Table 3.10, we show the percentage 
increase in consumer payments for different demand response capacities using 
ISO-NE data. We see that at the selected nodes the negative impacts get 
aggravated with the deeper penetration of demand response. We also see this 
situation with MISO data. Using MISO data, there are a total of 29 nodes that 
experience higher annual consumer payments with demand response 
participation.  
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Table 3.9: Nodes with the highest decrease in buyer payments in case study
3  
 
node 
number 
percentage 
of nodal  
reduction of  
energy 
nodal consumer payments 
 
decrease 
percentage 
decrease 
42 0.895 2,464,001 2.94 
49 0.895 2,216,223 2.92 
54 0.895 2,897,158 2.94 
56 0.895 2,154,083 2.94 
59 0.895 7,141,640 2.94 
60 0.895 2,015,031 2.95 
62 0.895 1,988,482 2.95 
80 0.889 3,149,489 2.84 
90 0.889 3,929,569 2.83 
116 0.895 4,633,195 2.90 
 
Table 3.10: Percent increase in buyer payments for various DRR capacities 
with respect to case 0  
 
node  
number 
percentage increase in consumer 
payments 
case 
3  
case 
5   
case 
7  
case 
9  
case 
11  
1 0.76 1.40 1.91 2.29 2.59 
2 0.71 1.32 1.81 2.17 2.45 
3 0.78 1.43 1.95 2.34 2.65 
4 0.90 1.63 2.23 2.69 3.07 
6 0.79 1.38 1.89 2.39 2.70 
8 1.17 2.09 2.85 3.47 4.00 
11 0.72 1.33 1.82 2.18 2.46 
12 0.69 1.28 1.74 2.09 2.35 
13 0.47 0.92 1.26 1.48 1.63 
16 0.60 1.14 1.56 1.87 2.09 
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In Table 3.11, we show the percentage increase in consumer payments at the 
10 nodes that experience the greatest negative impacts. We see that the 
percentage increase in consumer payments increases while there is more 
demand response capacity in the system.  
Table 3.11: Percent increase in buyer payments for various DRR capacities 
with respect to case 0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we summarized the impacts of demand curtailments in the 
DAMs using the results of our simulation studies. We briefly discussed the 
system-wide benefits such as the reduction in the system consumer payments 
and the system congestion rents. Most importantly, we identified the two key 
 
node  
number 
percentage increase in consumer 
payments 
case 
3  
case 
5   
case 
7  
case 
9  
case 
11  
1 0.68 1.27 1.84 2.39 2.90 
2 0.67 1.25 1.81 2.35 2.85 
3 0.68 1.28 1.86 2.40 2.91 
4 0.71 1.32 1.92 2.48 3.01 
6 0.69 1.28 1.86 2.41 2.93 
7 0.67 1.26 1.84 2.38 2.89 
8 0.78 1.44 2.07 2.68 3.24 
11 0.66 1.25 1.82 2.35 2.86 
12 0.66 1.23 1.79 2.33 2.83 
117 0.66 1.23 1.79 2.33 2.83 
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issues that arise when DRRs are allowed to participate in the DAM under 
Order No. 745 rules: the inefficient dispatch of DRRs and the negative 
impacts on some nodes in the system due to the increase in the post-
curtailment LMPs. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PROPOSED MODIFIED NBT 
The determination of the monthly threshold price at which DRRs are allowed 
to participate in the DAMs and be compensated for curtailment services is 
determined without the explicit incorporation of the transmission congestion 
in the power system. This may result in some cases of buyers who do not 
participate in curtailments of their load paying higher post-curtailment prices 
than under pre-curtailment conditions and the undesirable outcomes as 
discussed in Chapter 3. In this chapter, we propose modifications to the NBT 
that take explicitly into account congestion and the nodal character of the 
LMPs in the determination of the monthly threshold price. We propose the 
modifications on the basis of the identified set of causal factors that we 
determined in Chapter 3. In Section 4.1, we provide an overview of the 
proposed modifications. We describe the proposed modified NBT to 
determine the nodal monthly threshold prices for a system and the 
introduction of a guarantee that ensures that no node fares worse under 
demand curtailments than without them. In Section 4.2, we present the results 
of representative simulation studies using the proposed modified NBT and 
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show that they overcome the issues identified in Chapter 4. In Section 4.3, we 
provide a comparative analysis of the NBT and the proposed modified NBT.  
4.1 Overview of the Proposed Modified NBT 
We provide a concise mathematical statement of the modified NBT making 
use of some definitions we introduce. We define the set of indices of the 
weekdays of month m as 
 1 2: , , , , 1, 2, ,12 , 1.m md d d d D m for the year y  D =     
Here, 1 1d   if the first day is a week day, 1 2d  if the first day of the week is 
a Sunday and 1 3d  if the first day of the week is a Saturday. We collect the 
indices of the on-peak hours during the weekdays of month m in the set mD to 
construct 
 1 2: 7 ,8 , , 23 ; , , , , 1, 2, ,12.mm h h d d d d d d D m   H     
For each month of year and node of the system, we collect the LMPs that 
occurred
 
during
 
the on-peak hours of weekdays of the year 1y  in the set  
 , * : , 1, 2, ,12; 0,1,2, , .n nm m h mh m n N     E H    
 We define the set containing the nodal price level indices as  
 : 0,1, 2, , , 1,2, ,12; 0,1,2, , .n nm mk k K m n N   K     
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We collect the LMPs and sort them into 1n mK  buckets. We define the 
ceiling price for each month and node as 
 
,*
,
*
, 1, 2, ,12; 0,1,2, , ,n m
K
n n m h
m
n nm h m
max m n N

 
 
 
 

       E
 
  
(4.1) 
and the floor price for each month and node as 
  0 ,*
,
*
, 1, 2, ,12; 0,1, 2, , .n n m hm
n nm h m
min m n N

 
 
 
 

       E
      (4.2) 
 n mK
n
m
 and  0n m are the maximum and minimum price level for the month 
m and node n, respectively. The rest of the price levels are calculated using 
the recursion formula 
 
   1 , 1, 2, , 1; 1,2, ,12;
0,1,2, , ,
k k
n n n nm mm m
k K m
n N
       

 

     (4.3) 
where n m  may be selected arbitrarily based on the level of resolution 
desired.  
Now, we collect the indices of the hours during which the LMP at each node 
was between two price levels    1 ,k kn n
m m
   
in the bucket 
      *1 ,: , ; 1,2, , ;
1,2, ,12; 0,1,2, , .
k k k
n n n n nm h m mm m m
h h k K
m n N
         
 
G H 
 
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We define a separate set for the floor price level  0n m  bucket  
    *0 0,: , , 1, 2, 12; 0,1, 2, , .n n nm h mm mh h m n N       G H    
In order to obtain a representative figure of how much power was cleared 
within the interval between two adjacent price levels, we use the indices 
collected in the buckets to calculate the average power cleared in 
  
 
 
*
,
, 0,1, 2, , ; 1,2, ,12;
0,1, 2, , .
k
n
m
d
n m h
hk
n n mkm
n
m
p
g k K m
n N

 
 
  


G
G
 

     (4.4) 
We assign to each  kn
m
g its corresponding price level  kn
m
 , for 
0,1,2, , n mk K  . Analogously to the way we used the ROC in Chapter 2, we 
plot as a step function all the price levels  kn
m
 with respect to the cumulative 
sum of all the  kn
m
g for 0,1,2, , n mk K  .  We call the resulting curve the 
representative locational marginal price curve (RLMPC). Since each node of 
the system has different variations between the minimum and maximum LMP, 
we may use different resolutions to construct each nodal LMP curve 
In order to determine the nodal threshold at each node for each month m, we 
smooth the representative RLMPC curve using numerical methods. We denote 
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the smoothed RLMPC by as  n m  . In line with the FERC mandate, we 
determine the threshold point along the smoothed RLMPC beyond which 
demand curtailments become beneficial when the smoothed RLMPC becomes 
inelastic. We can express this condition analytically as  
 
( ) ( )
, 1, 2, ,12; 0,1,2,..., .n nm m
d
m n N
d
 
  
 

               
(4.5) 
We denote the solution of (4.5) as n m
 and we define the locational threshold 
price (LTP) n m  as 
   , 1, 2, ,12; 0,1, 2,..., .n n nm m m m n N
    
                
(4.6) 
We use the LTPs n m  to determine the basis for allowing the participation of 
DRRs in the DAMs and for their compensation at the LMP for the demand 
curtailments dispatched in the cleared DAMs. Whenever the pre-curtailment 
LMP at a particular node in the system is at or above its LTP n m , all the 
demand-curtailment offers at that node are allowed to participate in the DAM 
for that hour. All the DRRs whose offers are accepted are compensated at the 
resulting post-curtailment LMP for the services provided.  
In essence, the modified NBT does not change the way the DAMs are run by 
the IGO environment. The use of the LTP still requires that the DAMs be run 
twice: once without DRR participation and a second time with the DRR offers. 
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Instead of a single monthly threshold price, we use a different threshold at 
each node to identify those which can provide demand curtailment services 
and be compensated at the post-curtailment LMPs.  
A second issue we identified was the fact that under the rules of Order No. 
745, there may be nodes in the power system that experience higher total post-
curtailment payments even though they are non-DRR participants. As the 
basis of FERC decisions in Order No. 745 was to ensure that no participant is 
worse off due to DRR curtailments in the post-curtailment outcomes than in 
the pre-curtailment outcomes, a required step in the modified NBT is to 
ascertain that this condition is indeed met. We introduce a second 
modification in the FERC NBT to ensure that the “no participant is worse off” 
condition is met.  
For each hour h, we collect the nodes that experience higher post-curtailment 
LMPs than pre-curtailment LMPs and construct the set 
 , ,, * *: , , 1,2,...,12.mn nm h m hm h n h m           N H  
These nodes in the set 
,m h
N  are worse-off in the post-curtailment state and 
will incur in additional payments of 
 , , , ,,
,
* ** *
ˆ ,d dn n n nm h m h m h m hm h
m h
n
u p p 


                         
N
N
   (4.7) 
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where the quantity 
, ,
* *
ˆd dn nm h m hp p
   
   
 is the net cleared demand at the node 
n. Equation (4.7) is a positive quantity that must be taken into account when 
calculating the societal costs of demand curtailments. On the other hand, the 
subset of nodes 
,m h
N N  enjoy a post-curtailment LMP that is lower than 
the pre-curtailment LMP and the total benefit enjoyed by these nodes is 
 , , , ,,
,
* ** *
ˆ .d dn n n nm h m h m h m hm h
m h
n
u p p 


                         
N
N
   (4.8) 
We now proceed to include the quantities in (4.7) and (4.8) in the 
determination of the modified societal costs and benefits of demand 
curtailments. The total hourly costs of demand curtailments including the 
payments to the DRRs and the extra payments incurred by all nodes
,
,
m h
n N  
,m h
 is 
 
,, ,
,
m hm h m h
u 

  N
                                             
(4.9) 
where ,m h  are the total hourly payments to the DRRs as defined in (2.18).  
With this modification to the NBT, we ensure that no node is worse off in the 
post curtailment state than in the pre-curtailment. To account for the 
additional cost incurred by the nodes of 
,m h
N , the benefits of the nodes in 
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,m h
N N are decreased by the amount
,m h
u
N  so as to make the nodes 
,m h
n N unaffected by the load curtailment. 
We assign a fraction of 
,m h
 among all nodes that benefit and define the 
nodal demand curtailment cost 
,
n
m h

N for 
,m h
n N as 
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,
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                         
                         

N
N
 (4.10) 
We see in (4.10) that each node that benefits pays a pro-rata fraction of 
,m h

that is proportional to the load that is served post-curtailment. Now, to assure 
that the nodes that belong to the set 
,m h
N are made whole, we define the 
nodal side payment 
,
n
m h

N as  
 , , , , ,,
* ** *
ˆ , .d dn n n n nm h m h m h m h m hm h p p n  
                           
N N  (4.11) 
Essentially, with (4.11) we guarantee that the nodes that experienced higher 
LMPs due to demand curtailments receive compensation equal to what the 
increase was. If an inefficient dispatch of DRRs occurs then the total costs in 
(4.9) are socialized among the loads in the system.  
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4.2 Simulation Studies Using the Proposed Modified NBT 
We now proceed to present a set of simulation study results to show the 
impacts of the LTP in the clearing of the DAMs. For all the simulation studies 
presented in this chapter, we use the same test system and set-up as provided 
in Chapter 3. We denote the simulation studies using the proposed modified 
NBT as: pc for the cases using ISO-NE data and 
p
c for the cases using 
MISO data, with c as the demand response capacity. We start by discussing 
the differences between the nodal thresholds and the NBT system-wide 
threshold. Since now we are using the LMPs at each node to determine an 
LTP, the situation where a node does not meet the threshold price does not 
occur.  
In Fig. 4.1, we show the pre- and post-curtailment LMPs at node 8 during the 
first week of May 2010 in case study 3
p . We note that the nodal threshold 
8 5
 is such that it allows demand curtailments to occur during this week. The 
system-wide threshold for this month is so high compared to the LMPs at this 
node that the DRRs at this location cannot participate with demand-
curtailment offers. The LTP is a more appropriate metric for this node because 
it will always fall within the month’s maximum and minimum LMPs at the 
node. In Fig. 4.2, we show the pre- and post-curtailment LMPs during the first 
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week of May at node 116 in study case 3
p . We note that the nodal threshold 
is slightly higher than the system-wide threshold. 
 
Figure 4.1: Pre- and post-curtailment LMPs during the week of May 1-7 at 
node 8 in study case 3
p  
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Figure 4.2: Pre- and post-curtailment LMPs during the week of May 1-7 at 
node 116 in study case 3
p  
This is the situation at the nodes that experience higher LMPs and higher 
benefits from the demand curtailments. With the LTP methodology, the nodes 
that had little or no demand response participation have a cost-effectiveness 
metric that is commensurate with the prices of electricity. Also, the nodes that 
had disproportionate demand response participation due to a low system-wide 
threshold have a nodal threshold that correctly captures the cost-effectiveness 
of demand curtailments. Next, we explore the impacts of the LPT 
methodology on the unintended consequence of the instances where the 
payments to the DRRs exceed the benefits attained. 
In Table 4.1, we summarize the number of instances where the payments to 
the DRRs exceeded the benefits attained for some representative simulation 
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studies using the LTP methodology. In case 3
p , a total of 39 instances 
resulted in higher DRR payments than system benefits, which represents 
approximately 5.7% of the total curtailment hours. Compared to case 3 , 
where 17.8% of the curtailment hours resulted in extra payments due to the 
demand curtailments, the LPT methodology captured more of the hours that 
resulted in unintended consequences. The percentage of hours with 
unintended consequences is reduced for all cases with the LPT methodology, 
compared to the FERC NBT cases.  We note that the case studies with more 
demand response capacity result in fewer instances of higher payments due to 
demand curtailments. As more MWh are curtailed, the post-curtailment LMPs 
are further reduced, which in turn mitigates the payments to the DRRs.  
We note that with the proposed changes to the NBT there are still hours in 
which the societal costs exceed the benefits of DRR participation. This is due 
to the fact the benefits enjoyed did not mitigate payments to the DRRs. We 
note that the indices of the hours with higher costs than benefits are a subset 
of the same type of hours in the cases with less demand response capacity.  
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Table 4.1: Number of instances with extra payments due to demand 
curtailments for cases using ISO-NE data 
 
month 
number of instances where the societal costs exceed 
 the societal benefits of DRR participation 
case 
3
p  
case 
5
p  
case 
7
p  
case 
9
p  
case 
11
p  
Jan 0 0 0 0 0 
Feb 3 3 3 3 3 
Mar 0 0 0 0 0 
Apr 0 0 0 0 0 
May 10 8 0 0 0 
Jun 4 3 0 0 0 
Jul 0 0 0 0 0 
Aug 20 16 14 0 0 
Sep 1 0 0 0 0 
Oct 4 0 0 0 0 
Nov 1 1 1 1 1 
Dec 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 43 31 18 4 4 
 
In Table 4.2, we show the number of instances where the societal costs of 
DRR participation exceed the benefits using the MISO data. For all the cases 
using the MISO data there was a significant drop in the number of curtailment 
hours. This is to be expected because when using the FERC NBT the MISO 
cases had a large number of unintended consequences. As much as 66% of the 
curtailment hours resulted in higher payments than benefits in case 3 . In 
case 3
p , the 31 instances of higher DRR payments than benefits represent a 
20% of the total curtailment hours. With the MISO cases we also note that the 
63 
 
indices of the hours with higher costs than benefits are a subset of the same 
type of hours in the cases with less demand response capacity.  
Table 4.2: Number of instances with extra payments due to demand 
curtailments for cases using MISO data 
 
 
month 
number of instances where the societal costs exceed 
 the societal benefits of DRR participation 
case 
3
p  
case 
5
p  
case 
7
p  
case 
9
p  
case 
11
p  
Jan 3 3 3 3 3 
Feb 2 0 0 0 0 
Mar 0 0 0 0 0 
Apr 6 1 1 1 1 
May 0 0 0 0 0 
Jun 0 0 0 0 0 
Jul 0 0 0 0 0 
Aug 0 0 0 0 0 
Sep 8 4 4 4 3 
Oct 0 0 0 0 0 
Nov 12 10 10 10 10 
Dec 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 31 18 18 18 17 
 
To show the impacts of the modifications of the NBT made to ensure that no 
one is worse off we show the percentage decrease in consumer payments in 
the same nodes that were worse off in the cases using the FERC NBT as 
presented in Chapter 3. In Table 4.3, we see that due to the side-payment in 
(4.11) no node incurs in higher payments due to demand curtailments. In fact, 
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all these nodes benefited from the curtailments. These percentages are 
calculated using the base case 0 . 
Table 4.3: Percent decrease in buyer payments in selected nodes that were 
worse off with FERC NBT using the ISO-NE data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the other hand, in Table 4.4 we show the percentage decrease in consumer 
payments in the same nodes that benefited the most from demand curtailments 
under the FERC NBT. All these nodes continue to benefit from demand 
curtailments but, as expected with the modified NBT, these benefits are 
reduced due to the inclusion of the payment to the nodes that were worse off. 
We show the same results for the MISO data in Tables 4.5 and 4.6. 
 
 
 
node 
number 
percentage decrease in consumer 
payments 
case 
3
p  
case 
5
p  
case 
7
p  
case 
9
p  
case 
11
p  
1 0.80 1.03 1.20 1.39 1.57 
2 0.80 1.03 1.20 1.40 1.58 
3 0.80 1.03 1.20 1.38 1.56 
4 0.79 1.00 1.15 1.32 1.47 
6 0.80 1.03 1.20 1.38 1.55 
8 0.81 1.00 1.15 1.30 1.44 
11 0.81 1.04 1.22 1.41 1.59 
12 0.81 1.04 1.22 1.42 1.61 
13 0.80 1.05 1.23 1.43 1.64 
16 0.81 1.05 1.23 1.43 1.63 
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Table 4.4: Percent decrease in buyer payments in selected nodes that benefited 
with FERC NBT using the ISO-NE data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Percent decrease in buyer payments in selected nodes that were 
worse off with FERC NBT using the MISO data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
node 
number 
percentage decrease in buyer 
payments 
case 
3
p  
case 
5
p  
case 
7
p  
case 
9
p  
case 
11
p  
42 1.76 2.71 3.50 4.23 4.98 
49 1.74 2.67 3.45 4.17 4.91 
54 1.75 2.68 3.46 4.18 4.92 
56 1.75 2.68 3.46 4.18 4.92 
59 1.75 2.68 3.47 4.19 4.93 
60 1.75 2.68 3.47 4.19 4.93 
62 1.75 2.68 3.47 4.19 4.93 
80 1.71 2.62 3.38 4.09 4.81 
90 1.72 2.62 3.39 4.09 4.81 
116 1.75 2.69 3.48 4.21 4.95 
 
node 
number 
percentage decrease in consumer 
payments 
case 
3
p  
case 
5
p  
case 
7
p  
case 
9
p  
case 
11
p  
1 0.256 0.247 0.242 0.237 0.235 
2 0.270 0.256 0.255 0.254 0.257 
3 0.272 0.273 0.279 0.284 0.292 
4 0.259 0.251 0.246 0.240 0.238 
6 0.272 0.273 0.279 0.284 0.293 
7 0.268 0.262 0.257 0.253 0.252 
8 0.273 0.261 0.263 0.265 0.270 
11 0.290 0.287 0.300 0.312 0.328 
12 0.263 0.268 0.275 0.282 0.291 
117 0.275 0.273 0.282 0.289 0.300 
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Table 4.6: Percent decrease in buyer payments in selected nodes that benefited 
with FERC NBT using the MISO data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Comparison of the NBT and the Proposed Modified NBT 
Our goal is to propose modifications to the NBT without changing its nature 
and providing additional considerations to ensure efficiency of load 
curtailment services. In this section, we provide an overview of the 
modifications. The modifications of the FERC NBT were made based on the 
issues identified in Chapter 3. The modifications introduced are:  
 use of more appropriate data, i.e., rather than use the offer set for the 
entire period we only use the on-peak LMPs, 
 determination of a location-dependent threshold price, and 
 the explicit assurance that a demand curtailment does not negatively 
impact any load. 
 
node 
number 
percentage decrease in consumer 
payments 
case 
3
p  
case 
5
p  
case 
7
p  
case 
9
p  
case 
11
p  
42 0.252 0.334 0.401 0.449 0.505 
49 0.260 0.346 0.417 0.470 0.530 
54 0.260 0.346 0.418 0.470 0.531 
56 0.252 0.334 0.401 0.449 0.505 
59 0.258 0.344 0.415 0.467 0.527 
60 0.259 0.346 0.417 0.470 0.530 
62 0.258 0.344 0.415 0.467 0.528 
80 0.241 0.312 0.369 0.408 0.455 
90 0.241 0.312 0.369 0.408 0.455 
116 0.252 0.331 0.397 0.443 0.498 
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The rationale behind using on-peak LMPs instead of the offers is to explicitly 
include the impacts of transmission congestion. The failure to incorporate the 
impacts of transmission congestion in the determination of the threshold price 
may lead to the setting of an inappropriate threshold price. Since the LMPs 
explicitly account for the congestion impacts and the offer prices, the 
determination of the threshold price on the basis of the LMPs overcomes this 
problem. Furthermore, as demand curtailments rarely occur during off-peak 
hours, we restrict the data to on-peak LMPs and so we eliminate the reliance 
on the off-peak data so as not to distort the determination of the location-
dependent threshold price towards the lower LMPs.  
In Chapter 3, we identified that because of the non-nodal nature of the FERC 
NBT, some nodes may not participate in the DAM to be compensated for 
demand curtailments due to the high threshold price.  On the other hand, the 
monthly system-wide threshold may be so low that a node may have demand 
curtailments much more often than others. In other words, a system-wide 
threshold does not measure properly when a demand curtailment is 
appropriate in a node by node basis. With the proposed modifications, each 
node has its own monthly threshold price determined from the actual LMPs 
for the same month in the previous year and provides an appropriate nodal 
signal in the setting of the threshold price on a nodal basis.  
We assure that no one is worse off with the introduction of a side payment to 
the nodes that incur in higher payments due to the demand curtailments. As a 
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result, the test ensures that only in those cases when the societal benefits 
exceed the societal costs, are the DRRs compensated at the LMP.  
We start out with the scheme to determine nodal threshold prices for DRR 
participation. The modifications are in the “spirit” of Order No. 745, i.e., 
analogous to the process deployed for determining the monthly threshold 
price, and we introduce the explicit consideration of locational topological 
information into the NBT. In this way, we are able to incorporate transmission 
congestion effects into the determination of the threshold at each node. For 
each month and node we determine a locational threshold price (LTP) using 
the LMP data of the same month in the previous year. Since DRR participation 
is very limited during hours with low LMPs, we only consider on-peak LMPs 
during the weekdays to determine the LTPs. We construct a representative 
LMP curve for each node of the system, we use the smoothing techniques for 
this curve and then we determine the nodal threshold by finding the point on 
the curve where (2.3) condition is met. 
4.4 Summary  
In this chapter, we presented a set of three proposed modifications to the 
FERC NBT that address the issues identified in Chapter 3. These 
modifications take into account transmission congestion in the determination 
of the threshold price and ensure that no one is worse off in the post-
curtailment state. We also presented results from simulation runs using the 
69 
 
proposed modified NBT showing the lessening in the impacts due to the 
instances with higher societal costs than benefits of DRR participation and the 
assurance that no node incurs higher post-curtailment payments.    
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this thesis, we study the impacts of demand curtailments in the DAMs 
under the procedure and the accompanying compensation scheme mandated 
by the FERC in Order No. 745. By including the FERC NBT in the extended 
transmission constrained market model with the explicit representation of the 
DRRs, we identify and analyze certain unintended consequences that result 
from the nature of the determination of the threshold price that we observed in 
our extensive simulation studies of the impacts of FERC Order No. 745. Due 
to the lack of consideration of transmission-grid effects for the FERC NBT, 
the system-wide threshold may not be the appropriate metric to determine the 
dispatch of DRRs in all nodes of the system. Due to congestion patterns and 
location, the LMPs at some nodes may be lower than the monthly threshold 
price at all hours of the month. This situation does not allow any demand 
response participation at these nodes. On the other hand, nodes that 
experience higher LMPs may meet the monthly threshold at all hours of the 
month. We also identify that under the FERC’s scheme, there are instances in 
which the incentive payments to the DRRs exceed the benefits of the entire 
system. We also identify that there are nodes in the system that incur higher 
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payments in the post-curtailment state than in the pre-curtailment state even 
though they make no modifications of their loads. These affected nodes 
consistently have higher post-curtailment LMPs due to the fact that demand 
curtailments made at other nodes modify the congestion patterns in the 
system. 
We propose modifications to the NBT so as to explicitly address the identified 
issues. The modifications are in three principal areas – data usage, explicit 
consideration of transmission system in the determination of the threshold 
price and an additional test to guarantee that no buyer is worse off in the post-
curtailment state than in the pre-curtailment state. We propose to use on-peak 
LMPs instead of the offer data to construct a representative LMP curve. The 
use of the LMP data provides a more meaningful basis for the determination 
of the threshold price. We propose the replacement of the system-wide 
threshold price by node-specific threshold prices at each node to explicitly 
account for transmission considerations. To guarantee that no load incurs in 
higher post-curtailment payments than in the pre-curtailment state, we 
propose the introduction of a simple test to verify that this criterion is met. 
The proposed modifications keep both the spirit and nature of the NBT intact 
while addressing the issues identified in our studies. 
To test the ability of the proposed modifications to address the identified 
unintended consequences, we run simulation studies with the proposed 
modified NBT and compare them with the FERC NBT study cases. The results 
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of the testing we performed indicate that the instances of higher post-
curtailment purchase payment are reduced by at least an order of magnitude 
and in each case every node in the system is assured that it is not worse off 
due to demand curtailments. 
Due to the increasing use of renewable energy sources, an interesting 
extension of the work presented in this thesis is the inclusion of such 
generation technologies in the studies. Adding the variability and uncertainty 
of renewable energy sources in the study of the impacts of demand 
curtailments would give insight into how the NBT and the proposed modified 
NBT perform under such conditions. Another extension is the study of the 
impacts of demand curtailments under contingency conditions. A study of 
how well the proposed modified NBT performs in the event of losing a line is 
of great interest.  
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APPENDIX A 
DETAILS OF THE TEST SYSTEM 
 
For the studies presented in this thesis, we use the modified IEEE 118-bus 
system. This system, which is based on the ISO-NE network, has 54 
generators and 186 lines. We use load shapes from ISO-NE and MISO from 
the year 2010. For each hour of the year, we aggregate the load and then scale 
it and distributed proportionally among the nodes of the test system. The peak 
load of the test system has a value of 9,600 MW.  We assume that the demand 
of the buyers is a fixed quantity and is not responsive to price. In Fig. A.1 we 
show the scaled load for the first two weeks of the month of July. 
 
Figure A.1: Scaled hourly load for the IEEE 118-bus test system during the 
first week of July 2010 
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We make use the ROCs of each month to construct monthly offer curves for 
the test system. We distribute the prices and quantities of the monthly ROC 
among the 54 generators so as to construct an offer curve for the test system 
that mimics the shape of the original ROC. We then scale this offer curve to 
the test system level. By doing this, we take into consideration the seasonal 
variations of the offer curve. In Fig A.2 we show the ROC and the test-system 
offer curve (before scaling) during the month of July.  
 
Figure A.2: ROC and test-system offer curve during the month of July 
To determine the monthly threshold prices we apply the procedure described 
in Chapter 2 to the test system offer curves. In Table A.1 we show the 
monthly threshold prices for both the ISO-NE and MISO data.  
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Table A.1: Monthly threshold prices 
 
month 
monthly threshold prices 
ISO-NE data MISO data 
1 114.74 77.81 
2 105.69 74.51 
3 51.16 44.58 
4 39.01 54.85 
5 45.27 59.77 
6 48.21 49.56 
7 47.49 44.20 
8 34.63 49.96 
9 31.06 46.55 
10 26.18 42.66 
11 54.74 59.81 
12 82.32 63.52 
  
76 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] “Energy Policy Act of 2005,” United States Public Law 109-58. 
August 8, 2005. [Online]. Available: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/ 
PLAW-109publ58/pdf/PLAW-109publ58.pdf 
 
[2] FERC Staff, “Assessment of demand response and advanced 
metering,” Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Tech. Rep., 
December 2008. [Online]. Available: http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-
reports/12-08-demand-response.pdf 
 
[3] Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Wholesale competition in 
regions with   organized electric markets,” Washington DC, October 
17, 2008, Docket No. RM07-19000, Order No. 719. [Online]. 
Available:http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/ 2008/ 
101608/E-1.pdf 
 
 
[4] Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Demand response 
compensation in organized wholesale energy markets,” Washington 
DC, March 29, 2010, Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 
Docket No. RM10-17-000. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20100802113647-RM10-17-
000.pdf 
 
[5] Demand Response Supporters, “Reply comments of the demand 
response supporters,” Washington DC, August 10, 2010, Docket No. 
RM10-17-000. [Online]. Available: http://www.nera.com/nera-
files/FERC_Reply_Comments_Kahn_08.30.10.pdf 
 
[6] A. E. Kahn, Affidavit attached to “Reply comments of the demand 
response supporters,” Washington DC, August 10, 2010, Docket No. 
RM10-17-000. [Online]. Available: http://www.ferc.gov/whats-
new/comm-meet/ 2008/101608/E-1.pdf  
77 
 
[7] Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “Demand response 
compensation in organized wholesale energy markets,” Washington 
DC, March 15, 2011, Docket No. RM10-17000, Order No. 745, pp. 2, 
pp. 63, pp. [Online]. Available: http://www.ferc.gov/ 
EventCalendar/Files/20110315105757-RM10-17-000.pdf 
 
[8] J. Falk, “Paying for demand-side response at the wholesale level,” The 
Electricity Journal, vol. 23, no. 9, pp. 13-18, November 2010. 
 
[9] W. Hogan, “Demand response compensation, net benefits and cost 
allocation: comments,” The Electricity Journal, vol. 23, no. 9, pp. 19-
24, November 2010. 
 
[10] R. Borlick, “Paying for demand-side response at the wholesale level: 
the small consumer’s perspective,” The Electricity Journal, vol. 24, 
no. 9, pp. 8-19, November 2011. 
 
[11]  R. Pierce, “A primer on demand response and a critique of FERC 
Order No. 745,” Journal of Energy and Environmental Law, vol. 3, 
no. 1, pp. 102-109, January 2012. 
 
[12]  Market Surveillance Committee of the California ISO, “Opinion on 
economic issues raised by FERC Order No. 745,” June 6, 2011. 
[Online]. Available: http://www.caiso.com/2b97/ 
2b97a0bb6ef70.pdf 
 
 
[13]  Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc., “Order 
No. 745 compliance filing,” August 19, 2011, Docket No. ER11-___-
000. [Online]. Available: https://www.midwestiso.org/ 
Library/Repository/Tariff/FERC%20Filings/2011-08-19%20Docket 
%20No.%20ER11-4337-000.pdf 
 
[14]  ISO New England Inc., “Order No. 745 compliance filing,” August 
19, 2011, Docket No. ER11-4336-001. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.iso-ne.com/regulatory/ferc/filings/2011/aug/ 
er11_4336_000_prd_filing.pdf 
 
78 
 
[15]  Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc., “Net 
benefits test for demand response compensation,” August 11, 2011. 
[Online]. Available: https://www.midwestiso.org/Library/ 
Repository/Meeting%20Material/Stakeholder/DRWG/2011/20110829/
DRWG%20Draft%20Net%20Benefits%20Analysis%20Paper.pdf 
 
[16] California ISO, “Demand Response Net Benefits Test,” California 
ISO Final Proposal, June 29, 2011. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.caiso.com/Documents/FinalProposal-
DemandResponseNetBenefitsTest.pdf 
 
[17] PJM Interconnection, LLC, “FERC Order 745: the net benefits test”, 
DOCS# 642037, 2011. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/committees-groups/committees/mic/ 
20110510/20110510-item-08b-order-745-net-benefits-test.ashx 
 
[18] The Brattle Group, “Quantifying demand response benefits in PJM,” 
prepared for PJM Interconnection, LLC and Mid-Atlantic Distributed 
Resources Initiative (MADRI), January 29, 2007.  
 
[19] R. Walawalkar, S. Blumsack, J. Apt, and S. Fernands, “Analyzing 
PJM’s economic demand response program,” in 2008 IEEE Power 
and Energy Society General Meeting - Conversion and Delivery of 
Electrical Energy in the 21st Century, pp. 1-9, July 2008. 
 
[20] D. S. Kirschen, “Demand-side view of electricity markets,” 
Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 520-527, May 
2003. 
 
[21] P.I. Caro-Ochoa, “Evaluation of transmission congestion impacts on 
electricity markets,” M.S. thesis, Department of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 
2003. 
 
[22] A. S. Kowli, “Assesment of Variable Effects of Systems with 
Demand Response Resources,” M.S. Thesis, Department of Electrical 
and Computer Engineering, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, 2009. 
79 
 
 
[23] A. Borghetti, G. Gross, and C. A. Nucci, “Auctions with explicit 
demand-side bidding in competitive electricity markets,” in The Next 
Generation of Electric Power Unit Commitment Models, vol. 36, 
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001, pp. 53-77. 
 
[24] C. L. Su and D. Kirschen, “Quantifying the effect of demand 
response on electricity markets,” IEEE Transactions on Power 
Systems, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 1199-1207, August 2009.  
 
[25] A.J. Wood and B.F. Wollenberg, Power Generation, Operation and 
Control, 2nd ed. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1996. 
 
[26] G. Gross, ECE 530 Lecture notes, Analysis Techniques for Large-
Scale Electrical System, 2012. [Online]. Available: http://courses.ece. 
illinois.edu/ece530 
 
[27] G. Gross, ECE 573 Lecture notes, Power System Operation and 
Control, 2012. [Online]. Available: http://courses.ece. 
illinois.edu/ece573 
 
[28] “Power systems test case archive,” University of Washington 
Department of Electrical Engineering. [Online]. Available: 
http://www.ee.washington.edu/research/pstca/ 
 
 
